CVE-2026-64046
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG Sashiko points out that if end = 0 (start != 0) the current code will create a chain link to content type right after the wrap link: This would create a chain where the wrap link points directly to another chain link. The scatterlist API sg_next iterator does not recursively resolve consecutive chain links. meaning this is illegal input to crypto. The wrapping link is unnecessary if end = 0. end is the entry after the last one used so end = 0 means there's nothing pushed after the wrap: end start i v v v [ ]...[ ][ d ][ d ][ d ][ d ][rsv for wrap] Skip the wrapping in this case. TLS 1.3 can use the "wrapping slot" for it's chaining if end = 0. This avoids the chain-after-chain. Move the wrap chaining before marking END and chaining off content type, that feels like more logical ordering to me, but should not matter from functional perspective.
No public exploitation has been reported so far. No distribution fix is listed yet; apply vendor mitigations and monitor.
Recommended action: Track your distribution's security tracker and apply the fix as soon as it ships.
Severity metrics
CVSS 3.1 : 9.8 CRITICAL
Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected & fixed versions by distribution
Versions are the native distribution strings (backport-aware): RHEL/Debian/SUSE backport fixes, so compare with the distro version comparator (dpkg / rpm / vercmp), not the upstream version.
No affected package in the tracked watchlist yet (Debian, Ubuntu, Arch, SUSE, Red Hat...). Triage may still be pending.